Barangay Conciliation

1. Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983)

Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of prelim injunction to review the order of Judge Tomol CFI Cebu BR11.

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Victor & Flora Go filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint against petitioners Julius & Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to Php49,400. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that of failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by PD1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents. Respondent judge denied the said motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a motion for recon but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there should be barangay conciliation.

HELD:

The Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law makes no distinction with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon over criminal cases. The fact that the city or municipal courts are forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. This merely confers upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts. The conciliation process at the barangay level is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competent of the MeTCs and MTCs, but for actions cognizable by the RTCs as well.

2. Candido v. Macapagal, 221 SCRA 328 (1993)

FACTS:

· This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside of the trial court dismissing the complaint of petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido against private respondent Mila Contreras on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for petitioners' failure to comply with the mandatory barangay conciliation process required by Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

· Respondents Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, et al, who represented themselves to be the sole heirs of the late Agapito Candido executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale 3 covering parcels of land owned by the latter (Agapito Candido) and sold to private respondent Mila Contreras in whose name said properties are now registered.

· Petitioners instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan defendants to annul the Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, to cancel TCT No. 120656-M issued in the name of private respondent and to reinstate TCT No. 223602 in the name of Agapito Candido married to Sagraria Lozada.

· Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on the ground that petitioners failed to comply with the mandatory conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she resides in the same municipality with the petitioners.

· RTC ruling: dismissed the case for lack of prior referral of the dispute before the Katarungang Pambarangay. MFRs were denied.

· Hence, petitioners file this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge dismissing private respondent in the complaint instituted by the petitioners notwithstanding the fact that the other defendants in Civil Case No. 697-M-90 reside in different municipalities and cities.

ISSUE: WON prior referral of the said dispute before the Katarungang Pambarangay is necessary before filing the case to the RTC.

HELD: No. The Lupon of the barangay ordinarily has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same municipality, city or province.

Where the complaint does not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or it does not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or it does not have a certification that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case could be dismissed on motion.

In the instant case, the fact that petitioners and private respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.

Petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the purpose of the law in discouraging litigation among members of the same barangay through conciliation where the other parties reside in barangays other than the one where the Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.

3. Ramos v. CA, 174 SCRA 690 (1989) (old digest)

FACTS: Domingo Ramos authorized his brother Manuel to sell his share of lands owned by them in common with their other brothers and sisters. Manuel did. Later, Domingo revoked the power of attorney and demanded an accounting from Manuel. Manuel refused. Domingo then filed a complaint with the Punong Barangay of Pampanga, Buhangin District, Davao City. Manuel appeared but Domingo did not come on the scheduled hearing by the Punong Bgy. Domingo was represented, however, by his wife who said her husband wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with his brother. She requested that the Punong Bgy issue a certification that no settlement had been reached so a complaint could be filed in court. The Punong Bgy complied. Thereupon, Domingo sued Manuel in the RTC Davao, also for accounting, in Civil Case No. 18560-87.Manuel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of PD1508. He cited the failure of the Punong Bgy to refer the dispute to the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo after the unsuccessful mediation proceedings convened by him. The motion was denied Manuel then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari which we referred to the CA. CA denied the petition. It held that there was no need for such referral because Domingo had clearly indicated, by his refusal to appear before the Punong Bgy, that no extrajudicial settlement was possible between him and his brother. Manuel is now before us to question this decision.

HELD: The dispute should not have ended with the mediation proceedings before the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a settlement. It was not for the Punong Barangay to say that referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely because he himself had failed to work out an agreement between the parties. The Pangkat could have exerted more efforts and succeeded (where he had not) in resolving the dispute. If the complainant refuses to appear before the Punong Barangay, he is barred from seeking judicial recourse for the same course of action. The parties must appear in person without assistance of counsel, except minors and incompetents.

4. Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983)

PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO vs. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES, 126 SCRA 217, G.R. No. L-63277, November 29, 1983

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.

Facts:

Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which was leased to herein petitioner Petra Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five days of the month. The estate of the deceased is intestate.

On August 28, 1982, Atty Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September (1982), and thereafter vacate the premises. Petitioner failed to do so, thus the respondent instituted an ejectment case against the former. Petitioner moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. She points out that the parties are from the same cities and as such they must refer the dispute to the barangay Court or Lupon before going through the judicial courts. Respondent’s defense was that it was danger of prescribing under the statute of limitations. The motion was dismissed thus this case.

Since the petitioner was unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this petition for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not referral to a Barangay Lupon is required in cases regarding an intestate estate under administration.

(Atty Famador: When can an intestate estate of a deceased person have a separate and distinct personality similar to corporations?)

Ruling:

PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies but it is subject to certain exceptions. One of the exceptions is stated in Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules: “Any complaint by or against corporations, partnership or juridical entities, since only individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);

Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

5. San Miguel v. Pundogar, 173 SCRA 704 (1989)

Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against respondent Christina Trino before the RTC Lanao Del Norte. A certificate to file action, signed by the Barangay captain of Barangay Palao, Iligan City, bearing the notation tthat the respondent cannot be contacted was filed along with the complaint. On january 26, 1986 the trial court rendered a decision against private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment with the trial court, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to render its decision for failure of petitioner to go trhough the mandatory conciliation. Private respondent argued that the certification of the Barangay Captain was inadequate compliance with PD 1508, private respondent being a resident not of barangay palao but rather of brgy. Cabili. The trial court presided by respondent judge, issued an order upholding private respondents contentions and set aside the assailed decision holding that RTC acted without jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action for failure to comply with PD 1508. A motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction for failure to comply with PD 1508

Held: Where defendant fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice to appear before the lupon, the requirement of PD 1508 ust be regarded as having been satisfied by the plaintiff. The defendant in an action fails for one reason or another to respond to a notice to appear before the lupon, the requirement of PD 1508 must be regarded as having been satisfied by the plaintiff. A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the requirement of the statute by her own refusal or failure to appear before the lupon and then later to assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting up the very ground of non compliance with PD 1508. In simplest temrs, a defendant cannot be allowed to profit by her own default. Private respondent stated that she had not receive notice to appear before the lupon. We do not believe that the statement and suggestion should be given credence. The barangay authorities of barangay palao must be presumed to have performed their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing the certificate to file action. They must be presumed to have sent a notice to private respondnet to apepar before the Lupon.

6. Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 (1994)

Barangay Conciliation: Uy vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 (1994)

Facts

Felicidad Uy (Uy) subleased from Susanna Atayde (Atayde) half of the second floor of a building located in Makati. Uy operated and maintained a beauty parlor there. When the sublease contract expired, an argument arose between Uy and Atayde because the former was unable to completely remove all her movable properties from the premises. The argument led to a scuffle between Uy, Atayde, and Atayde's employees. Six days later, Atayde and her employees filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati. On the scheduled confrontation between the parties in the barangay, only Uy appeared. The confrontation was reset. Two informations for slight physical injuries were filed against Uy with the MTC of Makati. In her counter-affidavit, Uy alleged the prematurity of filing the criminal cases because of the undergoing of conciliation proceedings between them. She later on filed a motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. She also attached the certification of the barangay captain, attesting to the existence of an ongoing conciliation proceedings between them. MTC denied the motion to dismiss, explaining that the offense was about to prescribe or barred by the statute of limitations anyway. The motion for reconsideration by Uy was denied, hence the filing of Uy with the Supreme Court of the special civil action for certiorari.

Issue

Whether or not the judge of MTC Makati gravely abused his discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss of the petitioner, considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508 as reiterated in Sec. 412 of the Local Government Code and the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

Ruling

Yes. The respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the criminal cases.

It may thus be observed that the revised Katarungang Pambarangay law has at least three new significant features, to wit:

a) It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

b) As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

c) It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process.

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

Pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

7. Gegare v. CA, 177 SCRA 471 (1989)

This case involves a small piece of land. The decision was to cut it into 2 between the parties. Petitioner wants the whole lot while the private respondent if happy with his half.

FACTS:

A 270sq.mtr lot situated in GenSan was titled in the name of Paulino Elma. A reversion case was filed by the Republic against Paulino and the lot was reverted to the mass of public domain subject to disposition and giving preferential right to its actual occupant, Napoleon Gegare. Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for the lot in the Board of Liquidators (Board). Board resolved to dispose the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a negotiated sale. Private respondent protested against the application of petitioned, then Board denied the said protest.

A request for recon of private respondent was referred by the Board to Artemio Garlit, liquidator-designee, GenSan Branch for verification and investigation. After which, Garlit submitted a report to the Manila Ofc recommending division of the lot to the parties. Nevertheless, the Board denied the protest because the case had already been decided by the court. However, a MfR filed by private respondent was favorably considered by the Board. Board directed the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy and area of the lot. Findings were that only private respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO chief recommended the division of the property. Both parties appealed to the Ofc of the President but both appeals were dismiss.

A MfR filed by petitioner was denied on 29may84 Private respondent paid for the value of ½ of the lot and applied for the issuance of a patent. Patent was issued to ½ portion of the lot. Petitioner was also adviced to file his application and pay his portion. Petitioner filed an action for “Annulment and Cancellation of Partition” and/or to Declare them Null and Void” against private respondent and the Board. Private respondent filed MtD the complaint on the grounds et al …(5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to sec6 PD1508. The motion was granted. Petitioner MfR thereof to which an opposition was filed by private respondent. MfR was granted and private respondent was required to file his responsive pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On 24 july 1986, private respondent asked for a prelim hearing of the grounds for the MtD in his affirmative defenses. This was denied. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA questioning the said orders of the trial court. CA granted the petition, declaring the questioned orders null and void, and directing the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction. MfR filed by petitioner was denied. Thus, the herein petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there should be a barangay conciliation.

HELD:

Conciliation process at the Barangay level is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could effect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. Pending the first mediation, no case could be validly filed with the courts. Filing of complaint with the lupon suspends the prescriptive period for 60 days at most. Rogie: Filing a complaint with the lupon signifies that you want to conciliate or mediate. Since filing a case in court would signify that you want to litigate and not mediate. Therefore the conciliation should be finished before one can file a case in court. Escolin: Labor cases are exempt from Barangay Conciliation proceedings because the labor court has its own experts at arriving at an amicable settlement.

8. Galube v. Laureta, 157 SCRA 627 (1988)

Topic: Brgy Conciliation

Conciliation process at the Brgy level is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court.

G.R. No. 71091 January 29, 1988

HENRY GALUBA,
vs.
SPOUSES ALFREDO

FERNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Alfredo and Revelina Laureta ceded to petitioner all their rights and interests over a house and lot located in Quezon Hill, Baguio City for P70,000. Petitioner paid the Lauretas P50,000 with the balance payable later.

When P18,000 of the balance remained unpaid, the parties brought the matter before the barangay

On February 10, 1984, the parties entered into an amicable settlement whereby they agreed that the P18,000 would be paid in monthly installments starting April, 1984 and that non-compliance therewith would "mean execution in accordance with the Barangay Law." ¹

On July 17, 1984, Petitioner filed in the office of the barangay captain of Victoria Village an unsworn complaint for the annulment of the amicable settlement. He alleged therein that his consent to said settlement had been vitiated by mistake or fraud and therefore, the amicable settlement should be annulled and a new one entered into by the parties. ²

Meanwhile, the inferior court issued the writ after the Lauretas filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch IV, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution based on the amicable settlement. Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City a complaint for the annulment of the amicable settlement with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or restraining order. ³

The lower court denied the prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

The Lauretas filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action.

Petitioner contended that the lower court had jurisdiction over the case because he had named as defendants therein the municipal trial court and the sheriff of Baguio City and hence, the complaint fell under the exceptions in Section 2 [21 of P.D. 1508].

The Court noted the fact that petitioner failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided for in Section 11 of P.D. 1508 as the parties entered into said amicable settlement on February 10, 1984 and yet it was only on July 27, 1984 when petitioner repudiated it through an unsworn complaint for its annulment.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to annul an amicable settlement arrived at by the parties through the mediation of the Lupong Tagapayapa, in the absence of a repudiation of said amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided for in Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1508.

HELD: NO.

Section 6 of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in character

SEC. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.—No complaint, petition action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office of adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following cases:

[1] Where the accused is under detention;

[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations

Once the parties have signed an amicable settlement, any party who finds reasons to reject it must do so in accordance with Section 13 of P.D. 1508 which states:

SEC. 13. Repudiation. — Any party to the dispute may, within ten [10] days from the date of the settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the Barangay Captain a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for filing of a complaint, provided for in Section 6, hereof.

Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which were promulgated "for the amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also provides that "[f]ailure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation.

Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set forth in Section 13 must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he can no longer file an action in court to redress his grievances arising from said settlement.

It should be emphasized that under Section 11 of said law, "[t]he amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of the ten [10] days from the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court."

Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508 does not provide for a judicial procedure for the annulment of an amicable settlement because the remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a court annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort to a court action after he has repudiated the settlement in accordance with Section 13 as Section 6 clearly states that repudiation is a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint regarding any matter within the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be clarified, however, that the "petition for nullification" mentioned in Section 11 refers to an arbitration award pursuant to Section 7 of the same law and not to an amicable settlement.

The primordial objective of P.D. 1508 is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To allow court actions assailing unrepudiated amicable settlements would exacerbate congestion of court dockets. This is repugnant to the spirit of P.D. 1508.

Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the ten-day period, petitioner is left with no recourse but to abide by its terms. He, therefore, acted correctly when he eventually fully satisfied his obligation pursuant to the amicable settlement, thereby, rendering his case moot and academic.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

JURISDICTION

2. Ortigas v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89 (1983)

ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA, 120 SCRA 89, G.R. No. L-36098, January 21, 1983

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement whereby for and in consideration of P55,430, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of his residential house on said lot within two years, petitioner, as owner, has agreed to refund to private respondent the amount of P10.00 per square meter.

When the aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private respondent accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same and requested for his refund amounting to P4,820.

Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila, against petitioner. A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and improper venue. City Court Judge Jose B. Herrera in his order held in abeyance the resolution on the motion until after the trial of the case on the merits.

A reconsideration of the said order having been denied, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A motion to dismiss was filed by private respondent, and on November 17, 1972, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private respondent in his complaint, being less than P10,000, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues among others that: (a) as detriment from the allegations of the complaint, the action is for specific performance of contract; and (b) actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation such as complaints for specific performance of contract are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the case is for the collection of a sum of money.

2. Whether or not the city court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on its merits

Ruling:

1. NEGATIVE. The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and not for a sum of money and therefore incapable of pecuniary estimation, because what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to be proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation because the obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the performance of which being the more basic issue to be inquired into.

2. NEGATIVE. JURISDICTION IS LODGED TO CFI (now RTC).

Although private respondent's complaint in the court a quo is designated as one for a sum of money and damages, an analysis of all the factual allegations of the complaint patently shows that what private respondent seeks is the performance of petitioner's obligation under the written contract to make the refund of the rate of P10 per square meter or in the total amount of P4,820, but only after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus fall under CFI’s Jurisdiction (now the RTC).

3. Primero v. IAC, 156 SCRA 435 (1987)

Primero

156 SCRA 435

Facts: Primero instituted proceedings against DM transit corporation with the Labor arbiters of the Department of Labor, for illegal dismissal and for recovery of backwages and reinstatement. After due investigation, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering DM to pay complainant Primero P2000 as separation pay. The judgment was affirmed by the NLRC and later by the secretary of labor. The jurisdiction over such claims was however removed by PD 1367 which provided that labor arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. Afterwards, primero brought suit against DM in the CFI of Rizal seeking recovery of damages caused not only by the breach of his employment but also by oppresive and inhuman and consequently tortious, acts of his employer and its officers antecedent and subsequent to his dimissal from employment without just cause. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for the reason that at the time that the complaint was filed the labor code as amended conferred exclusive, original jurisdiction over claims for moral or other damages, not on ordinary courts but on labor arbiters. This judgment was affirmed by the Intermediate appellate court. This is the judgment now subject of the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding that the claim for moral or other damages is vested not on ordinary courts but on labor arbiters.

Held: Actually we reiterate in this decision the doctrine already laid down in other cases to the effect that the grant of jurisdiction to the Labor arbiter by Article 217 of the Labor Code is sufficiently comprehensive to include claims for moral and exemplary damages sought to be recovered from an employer by an employee upon the theory of his illegal dismissal. Ruling to the contrary are deemed abandoned or modified accordingly. The petition is dismissed.

4. Trade Union of the Philippines vs. Coscolluela, 140 SCRA 302 (1985)

Facts

The petition seeks to enjoin the public respondent from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 10905 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.

Petitioner union filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor and Employment against Super Garments Manufacturing Corporation on May 12, 1985. Super Garments and Rustan Commercial Corporation have separate compartments in the same building at Malugay and Mayapis streets. It is called the Yupangco building.

It is alleged by the petitioner union that goods of Super Garments were spirited out of its strike-bound premises thru Rustan’s warehouse. Whereupon, the union picketed not only Super Garments but also Rustan. As a result Rustan filed Civil Case No. 10905 before the respondent judge for injunction and damages thru the PECABAR law office and petition No. 971 with the National Labor Relations Commission also to enjoin the union from picketing its premises.

Petitioner union claims that respondent judge has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction because the case is a labor dispute, that the prerogative belongs to the Minister of Labor and Employment. Upon the other hand, private respondent Rustan says that the respondent judge has jurisdiction because there is no labor dispute between it and the union even as it went to the National Labor Relations Commission to seek identical relief.

Issue

Whether or not respondent judge has jurisdiction to issue an injunction.

Ruling

At this stage there appears to be no labor dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent for which reason the latter was justified in seeking relief in respondent judge’s court. The unfair labor complaint filed by petitioner union on July 12, 1985 does not prove a labor relationship. By the same token it was improper for the private respondent to have filed Case No. 971 with the National Labor Relations Commission.

In the light of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued on September 23, 1985 is hereby LIFTED. However, private respondent Rustan Commercial Corporation is directed to withdraw its case before the National Labor Relations Commission.

6. Cabrera v. Tiano, 8 SCRA 542 (1963)

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

G.R. No. L-17299 July 31, 1963

JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and CRESENCIA POTESTAS OMULON, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARIANO T. TIANO, defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

FACTS:

Under date of June 20, 1957, in action for "Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, with Damages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano.

In the complaint, it was alleged that petitioners were entitled to a portion of the land, since Josefina did not sign the sale and Crescencia was a minor at the time petitioners’ father sold the land to the defendant; that defendant Tiano had usurped the portions belonging to them, to their damage and prejudice in the amount of P7,000.00, which consisted of their share in the produce of the property, during the period of defendant's possession.

In answer, defendant claimed that the plaintiffs herein knew of the sale and that he was not aware of any defect in the title of his vendors. As a Special Defense, defendant alleged that he was the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, from the date of purchase.

The court a quo rendered the following judgment —WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled each to 1/8 of the property in question.

The trial court in the same decision, commissioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff, to partition the property in question and render a report within 30 days. Defendant moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that prescription had already set in, and his (defendant's) title, had become irrevocable, and that the award of damages had no factual and legal basis. The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 5, 1960. The Commissioner's report, partitioning the property was submitted on April 11, 1960. Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960, and on May 14, 1960, the same was given due course and elevated to this Court.

In claiming that prescription had taken place, defendant insisted that the period should be counted from the date the summons was served on him, which was on July 2, 1957. It was agreed, however, that the complaint for the recovery of the land in question was presented on June 20, 1957, and the summons was sent out the following day.

The Civil Code, provides that—

The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor. (Art. 1155)

Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of the property in question because the judicial summons, which could civilly interrupt his possession (Art. 1123, N.C.C.), was received by him only on July 2, 1957 and the sale in question was made on July 2, 1947.

ISSUE:

1. WON the defendant acquired the property by acquisitive prescription?

2. WON the SC have the authority to decide as to questions of fact?

HELD:

1. NO. Conceding, for the purposes of argument, that the article cited is applicable, still appellant cannot avail himself of acquisitive prescription, for the simple reason that no finding was made by the trial court that his possession from the time of the sale (July 2, 1947), was with just title, in good faith, in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted (Arts. 1117 & 1118, N.C.C.).

Good faith is a question of fact which must be proved (Art. 1127, N.C.C.). For the purposes of acquisitive prescription, just title must also be proved, it is never presumed (Art. 1131, N.C.C.). The factual requisite of adverse possession do not appear in the stipulation of facts and the trial court did not make findings to this effect.

2. NO. (relevant sa remedial law):These circumstances could and/or should have been ventilated, had the appeal been taken to the Court of Appeals. Defendant, however, having chosen to appeal the decision directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived questions of fact and raised only questions of law. There being no factual finding by the lower court of the presence of the requisites of acquisitive prescription this Court has to reject, as did the trial court, said defense. Moreover, on July 2, 1957, when the summons was received, the ten (10) years necessary for acquisitive prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period terminated on that very day.1äwphï1.ñët

As to the award of damages, We find Ourselves devoid of ample authority to review the same, since it involves appreciation of facts. It cannot be denied, as found by the lower court, that plaintiffs herein are entitled to a share in the land. Verily, they should also share in the produce, which, admittedly, was enjoyed by the defendant-appellant herein.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellant in both instances.

7. Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)

Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)

FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance filed a complaint with the Makati RTC for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuey Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

Private respondent filed a compliant in the Quezon City RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Only the amount of P210 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioner to raise objection. Upon order of the SC, the case was assigned to a different branch due to under-assessment of docket fees.

The case was thereafter assigned to Judge Asuncion who required the parties to comment on the Clerk of Court’s letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the SC Resolution since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.

Private respondent filed a Re-Amended complaint stating therein a claim of not less than 10M as actual compensatory damages in the prayer. However, the body of the amended complaint alleges actual and compensatory damages and atty’s fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70

Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating that the same constituted proper compliance with the SC Resolution. Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari with the CA questioning the order of Judge Asuncion. Private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20M as damages bringing the total claim to P64,601,623.70. CA denied petition and granted writ of prelim attachment.

HELD: 1) It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2) Permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3) If the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

Escolin: There are some compulsory counterclaim that needs payment of docket fees, and some which does not.

8. Hodges v. CA, GR 87617, 184 SCRA (1990)

JOE HODGES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF LEON P. GELLADA, plaintiff-appellee in Civil Case No. 6512, ROMEO MEDIODIA, plaintiff-appellant in Civil Case No. 6513, and HEIRS OF FERNANDO MIRASOL, plaintiff-appellee in Civil Case No. 6516, respondents.

G.R. No. 87617 April 6, 1990

Facts:

Three practicing lawyers filed separate actions for damages against petitioner for alleged defamatory statements claiming damages in the form of moral damages, damage to their law practice, exemplary and temperate damages. Petitioner (then defendant) questioned the jurisdiction of the courts over these cases pointing out that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case unless the corresponding docket fee is paid.

In the present petition, in the case of Gellada vs. Hodges the total amount of the claim for damages is about P460,000.00, the estimated docket fee due is P770.00 but what was paid only was P32.00. Despite the order of the trial court on August 31, 1972 and another order ten years later, that is on March 11, 1982, requiring plaintiff to pay the correct docket fee, Gellada paid the amount of P168.00 Thus his total payment amounts to just P200.00, which is still much less than the amount of P770.00 due.

Similarly in Mediodia vs. Hodges where the claim is approximately P360,000.00 and the appropriate filing fee would be about P570.00, the plaintiff paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. After the two aforesaid order of the trial court were issued, Mediodia paid on September 5, 1982 the amount of P168.00 bringing his payment to a total of P200.00 which is also much less than the amount of P570.00 due for docket fee.

In the case of Mirasol vs. Hodges, the total claim is for P410,000.00 and the amount of filing fee due is P670.00. Mirasol paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. He did not pay any additional sum even after the two orders of the court had been issued.

Issue:

WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter in the given three cases due to the failure to pay in full the prescribed docket fees.

Ruling:

As early as Lazaro vs. Endencia, this Court held that an appeal is not deemed perfected if the appellate court docket fee is not fully paid. In Lee vs. Republic, this Court ruled that a declaration of intention to be a Filipino citizen produced no legal effect until the required filing fee is paid. In Malimit vs. Degamo, We held that the date of payment of the docket fee must be considered the real date of filing of a petition for quo warranto and not the date it was mailed. In Magaspi vs. Ramolete, the well-settled rule was reiterated that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.

In Manchester, this rule was emphasized when this Court stated "The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading.

The rule in Manchester was relaxed in Sun Insurance vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, whereby this Court declared that the trial court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Nevertheless, in Sun Insurance, this Court reiterated the rule that it is the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests the court with Jurisdiction over the subject matter of nature of the case.

No doubt, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter in said three (3) cases due to the failure to pay in full the prescribed docket fee. Thus, the entire proceedings undertaken in said cases are null and void. The plaintiffs in said cases are practicing lawyers who are expected to know this mandatory requirement in the filing of any complaint or similar pleading. Their non-payment of the prescribed docket fee was deliberate and inexcusable.

9. Spouses de Leon v CA, 287 SCRA (1998)

Spouses De Leon

287 scra 94

Facts: Private respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two parcels of land against petitioners. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk of court required private respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents nonpayment of the correct amount of the docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000 for attorneys fees, private respondents should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640 based on the alleged value fo the two parcels of land. Private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint. Private respondets filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. They brought the matter to the CA which rendered a decision annulling the orders of the trial court. The appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.

Issue: WON is assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property subject matter of the contract should be used as basis as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation

Held: Conformably with this discussion of actions where the value of the case cannot be estimated the court held that an action for recession of contract is one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200. 00 as then fixed in the former rule 141. We hold that Judge dalisay did not err in considering as basically one for recission or annulment of contarct which is not suspectible of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the fee for docketing fee it is P200 an amount already paid by plaintiff now respondent Matilda Lim. Thus, although eventually the result maybe the recovery of land, it is the natrue of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The CA correctly applied these cases to the present one. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.

10. Manuel v. Alfeche, 259 SCRA 475

Jurisdiction: Manuel vs. Alfeche, 259 SCRA 475 (1996)

Facts

On January 9, 1992, the City Prosecutor of the City of Roxas filed with the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 15, Roxas City an Information for libel. After trial, the respondent judge rendered the assailed Decision finding three of the accused guilty and acquitting a fourth. However, “(t)he civil indemnity by way of moral damages (was) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction” on the ground that petitioner did not pay the filing fees therefor. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this instant petition for review.

Issue

Whether or not the offended party should recover moral damages.

Ruling

The ruling that “when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply ‘constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages’” was actually intended to apply to a situation wherein either (i) the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or (ii) the complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary, temperate and/or nominal damages but has not specified ANY amount at all, leaving the quantification thereof entirely to the trial court’s discretion, and NOT to a situation where the litigant specifies some amounts or parameters for the awards being sought, even though the different types of damages sought be not separately or individually quantified. To hold otherwise, the result would be to permit litigants to continue availing of one more loophole in the rule on payment of filing fees, and would not serve to attain the purpose of the revised Sec. 1 of Rule 111, which is to discourage the gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal’s office to include in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple millions of pesos without paying any filing fees.

For utter lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED.

Cause of action

1. Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369 (1971)

Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369 (1971)

FACTS: Spouses Dacanay were indebted to Citizens’ Surety Insurance. As security, the Dacanays mortgaged a parcel of land in Baguio. Since they were not able to pay said debt, the said lot was sold in a foreclosure sale. However, proceeds of the sale were insufficient to satisfy said debt. Thus Citizens’ Surety filed a complaint with the Manila CFI, seeking to recover the balance, plus 10% thereof as atty’s fees, and other costs.

At petitioner’s request, respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the Phils Herald. But despite the publication and deposit of a prepaid copy of the complaint at the Manila Post Office, defendants did not appear within the period of 60 days from last publication, as required by the summons.

Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in default; but instead, respondent Judge asked it to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the suit being in personam and the defendants not having appeared. Respondent Judge dismissed the case despite plaintiff’s argument that the summons by publication was sufficient and valid under sec16 Rule14 RRC.

HELD: Where the action is in personam (e.g. action for deficiency judgment), the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a personal service of summons. Without such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due process. Summons by publication cannot confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. The proper recourse for a creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor and cause them to be attached, in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be deemed valid and effective. The case should not be dismissed but should be held pending in the court's archives, until plaintiff succeeds in determining the whereabouts of the defendants' person or properties and causes valid summons to be served personally or by publication.

Escolin: Citizen Surety could not have availed of summons by publication because this provision applies only to actions in rem or quasi in rem. He should have invoked Rule 57, Sec. 1 (f) to convert the action into quasi in rem

Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.(1a)

2. Backrach Motor v. Icarañgal, 68 Phil 287 (1939)

G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939

BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., defendants-appellees.

MORAN, J.:

Facts:

Defendant Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for one thousand six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in security for its payment, executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna.

Thereafter, defendant defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due on the note.

Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff BACHRACH MOTOR.

The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.

By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered plaintiff took the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security.

HELD: Yes.

Section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure which provides that:

a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and share it in the general assets of the estate.

Under this provision, It has been uniformly held by this court that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly. (Veloso vs.Heredia, 33 Phil., 306; Cf. Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404.)

The same rule applies under the Insolvency Law. There is indeed no valid reason for not following the same principle of procedure in ordinary civil actions. With the substitution of the administrator or executor in place of the deceased, or of the assignee or receiver in place of the insolvent debtor, the position of the parties plaintiff and defendant in the litigation is exactly the same in special or insolvency proceedings as in ordinary civil actions.

SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION:

As we have heretofore stated, the creditor's cause of action is NOT ONLY SINGLE BUT INDIVISIBLE, although the agreements of the parties, evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. (Frost vs. Witter, 132 Cal., 421.) The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of the two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and unexpensive administration of justice.

We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage.

In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency.

In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election.

Thus, in Santos vs. Moir (36 Phil., 350, 359), we said: "It is well recognized that a party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each part separately. A complaint for the recovery of personal property with damages for detention states a single cause of action which cannot be divided into an action for possession and one for damages; and if suit is brought for possession only a subsequent action cannot be maintained to recover the damages resulting from the unlawful detention."

The same doctrine is stated in Lavarro vs. Labitoria (54 Phil., 788), wherein we said that "a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits" and that a claim for partition of real property as well as improvements constitutes a single cause of action, and a complaint for partition alone bars a subsequent complaint for the improvements.

The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." (1 C.J., 1107) It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). (

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

3.Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521 (1989) (old digest)

Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521 (1989)

FACTS: Spouses Padilla bought on credit 3 units of Isuzu trucks from Industrial Transport & Equipment. They executed a prom note for the balance of the purchase price. This was secured by a chattel mortgage of said trucks and, as additional collateral, a real estate mortgage on their land.

The Padillas failed to pay several installments on the prom note, the assignee Industrial Finance Corp. (IFC) sued them in the CFI for the recovery of the unpaid balance including attys fees. CFI ruled on 16Apr75 in favor of IFC. On appeal, CA sustained the CFI’s ruling except for modification of attys fees from 25% to 12% of the balance.

Meanwhile on 09Sep71 private respondents Juan and Honorata Delmendo filed a complaint against IFC, as principal party, and the Padillas, as formal parties, in respondent CFI. The Delmendos alleged that they were the transferees of the real property which was mortgaged earlier by the Padillas to Ind’l Transport. The Delmendos prayed for the cancellation of the mortgaged lien annotated of the TCT and the delivery to them by petitioner of the owner’s copy of said title with damages and attys fees, considering that IFC waived its rights over the mortgage when it instituted a personal action against the Padillas for collection of sum of money.

IFC moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that is has not waived its right over the mortgage lien. The Delmendos filed a motion for summay judgment which the CFI granted. CFI ruled in favor of the Delmendos. IFC filed a MfR which was denied. Hence this petition.

HELD: A mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and instead bring an ordinary action to collect with the right to execute on all the properties of the debtor, including the subject-matter of the mortgage. If he fails in the collection suit, he can not thereafter foreclose on the mortgage.

Escolin: In case of splitting of a single cause of action, the ground for dismissal is res judicata.

Escolin: If there is one cause of action but two remedies, the plaintiff should have pleaded alternative remedies in his complaint.

4.Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340 (1985) (old digest)

Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340 (1985)

Facts: Administrator of estate-lessor files a case for ejectment before the City Courts against the lessee. Lessee files counterclaim in excess of the City Court’s jurisdiction. City Court decides for plaintiff. On appeal, CFI rules for defendant and grants him damages. This became final. Plaintiff files separate for nullifying the CFI decision on the ground that the damages awarded was beyond the jurisdiction of the City Court.

Held: A counterclaim not presented in the lower court can not be entertained on appeal. Defendant is deemed to have waived his counterclaim in excess of the City Court’s jurisdiction. It is as though it has never been brought before City Court. It may not be entertained on appeal. The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise. When court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or otherwise. The excess award of the CFI is therefore null and void. Action to declare nullity of award is proper. The award not in excess stands.

The defendant's counterclaim for damages is GRANTED to the extent of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS. The grant of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS in excess of such amount is hereby declared NULL and VOID, for having been awarded beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

Escolin: A compulsory counterclaim beyond the jurisdiction of the court can be filed as a separate action.

5. Maceda v. CA, 176 SCRA (1989)

Maceda vs. CA

176 scra 440

Facts: A leased property originally belonged to the spouses Monserrat, a maternal aunt of the petiton. After the spouses emigrated to the US they leased their house and lot in San Juan to the petitioner. As the house was old and run down, petitioner proposed to have it repaired and renovated subject to reimbursement of expenses but maceda introduced more improvements. Atty Zapata informed the petitioner that the properly has been sold to pablo Zubiri . He was asked to vacate it. Maceda insisted on being reimbursed for his improvements. An ejectment suit was filed against Maceda in the MTC of san juan metro manila. In his answer to complaint, amceda set up a counterclaim for the value of improvements. The MTC ordered him to vacate the premises and pay the plaintiff P2000 per month as compensation. Both parties appealed to the RTC, which set aside the inferior courts decision. It dismissed the ejectment complaint and ordered to pay Maceda P182, 000 for his necessary and useful improvements. The CA rendered a decision, modifying the decision. The CA denied Maceda's claim for reimbursement of the cost of his improvements. It ruled that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the claim which exceeds P20,000. In his petition for review of that decision, Maceda assails the setting aside of the money judgment or award for his improvements.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in holding that the new owners need of the premises is a legitimate ground for the judicial ejectment of the lessee.

Held: Maceda's petition has no merit. The CA correctly ruled that the MTC did not have original jurisdiction over his counterclaim as it exceeds P20,000. Correspondingy, the RTC did not have appellate jurisdiction over the claim. The decision of the MTC of san juan awarding him P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that of the RTC raising the award to P182, 200 were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan trial court in a civil action for sum of money is limited to a demand that does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and cost but inclusive of damages of whatever kind; A counterclaim beyond that jurisdictional limit may be pleaded only by way of defense but not to obtain an affirmative relief. Jusrisdiction cannot be appropriated by a court no matter how well intentioned it is, even in pursuit of the clearest substantial right, such as collection of judgment debt. Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

While it is true that under BP 8777 a lesseee may not be ejected on account of the sale or mortgage of the leased premises, the new owners need of the premises for the construction of dwellings for its employees, coupled with the lessees failure to pay the rentals since Dec. 1981 are to our mind, a legitimate ground for the judicial ejectment of the lessee. Wherefore, dismissal of his counterclaim for the value of improvements is affirmed.

6. Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91 (1987)

Cause of Action: Bayang vs. CA, 148 SCRA 91 (1987)

Facts

Bayang sued Biong for Quieting of Title with damages in 1969, which resulted in a ruling in his favor in 1978. In 1978, Bayang sued Biong again but this time for the income earned from the land while it was still in the latter’s possession from 1970 to 1978.

Issue

Whether or not the second case is barred by the first.

Ruling

The subject matter in the two cases are essentially the same as the income is only a consequence or accessory of the disputed property. The claim for income from the land is incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for ownership of the land. As the filing of the two cases constitute splitting of the cause of action, the second case is barred by the first. Also, for about seven years, the petitioner made no move at all to amend his complaint to include a claim for the income supposedly received by private respondent during that period. He did not make the proper claim at the proper time and in the proper proceeding. Whatever right he might have had is now deemed waived because of his negligence.

PARTIES

1. Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 115 SCRA 783 (1982) (old digest)

Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 115 SCRA 783 (1982)

FACTS Juasing Hardware, single proprietorship owned by Ong Bon Yong, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. The case proceeded to pre-trial and trial. After plaintiff presented its evidence and rested its case, defendant filed a Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to Evidence) praying that the action be dismissed for the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue. Defendant in said Motion contended that plaintiff Juasing is a single prop, not a corp or partnership duly registered in accordance with law and therefor is not a juridical person with legal capacity to bring an action in court. Juasing filed an Opposition and moved for the admission of an Amended Complaint. CFI Judge dismissed the case and denied admission of Amended Complaint.

HELD Correction of the designation of the plaintiff (from name of sole proprietorship to name of individual owner) is merely formal, not substantial, and hence may be corrected at any stage of the action.

2. Chang Kai Shek v. CA, 172 SCRA 389 (1989)

FACTS:

Fausta F. Oh worked at the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a continuous period of almost 33 years. And now, out of the blue, and for no apparent or given reason, this abrupt dismissal.

Oh sued. She demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity benefits and moral and exemplary damages. 1 The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not be sued, the complaint was amended. 2 Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school.

As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows:

Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public Instruction, any private school or college recognized by the government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90 days after the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws.

The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition by the government,

HELD:

It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action." It is also not denied that the school has NOT been incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of her claims against the school.

Having been recognized by the government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint was filed notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the private respondent's complaint.

There should also be no question that having contracted with the private respondent every year for thirty two years and thus represented itself as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to Article 1431 of the Civil Code, "through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it."

As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after the private respondent's dismissal. 6

It is easy to imagine the astonishment and hurt she felt when she was flatly and without warning told she was dismissed. There was not even the amenity of a formal notice of her replacement, with perhaps a graceful expression of thanks for her past services. She was simply informed she was no longer in the teaching staff. To put it bluntly, she was fired.

For the wrongful act of the petitioner, the private respondent is entitled to moral damages. 14 As a proximate result of her illegal dismissal, she suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and even besmirched reputation as an experienced teacher for more than three decades. We also find that the respondent court did not err in awarding her exemplary damages because the petitioner acted in a wanton and oppressive manner when it dismissed her. 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED except for the award of separation pay, which is reduced to P2,880.00. All the other awards are approved. Costs against the petitioner.

This decision is immediately executory.

3. Commissioner of Customs v. KMK Gani, 182 SCRA 591 (1990)

G.R. No. 73722 February 26, 1990

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,

vs. K.M.K. GANI, INDRAPAL & CO., and the HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

Armando S. Padilla for private respondent.

FACTS

This is a review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE. the subject ten (10) cartons of articles are hereby released to the carrying airline for immediate transshipment to the country of destination under the terms of the contract of carriage. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 1

The pertinent facts may be summarized thus:

On September 11, 1982, two (2,) containers loaded with 103 cartons of merchandise covered by eleven (11) airway bills of several supposedly Singapore-based consignees arrived at the Manila International Airport on board Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR 311 from Hongkong. The cargoes were consigned to these different entities: K.M.K. Gani (hereafter referred to as K.M.K.) and Indrapal and Company (hereafter referred to as INDRAPAL), the private respondents in the petition before us; and Sin Hong Lee Trading Co., Ltd., AAR TEE Enterprises, and C. Ratilal all purportedly based in Singapore.

ISSUE

WON private respondents failed to establish their personality to sue in a representative capacity, hence making their action dismissable,

RULING

YES.

The law is clear: "No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." 7

However, the Court in a long line of cases has held that a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the Philippines may not be denied the right to file an action in the Philippine courts for an isolated transaction. 8

Therefore, the issue on whether or not a foreign corporation which does not have a license to engage in business in this country can seek redress in Philippine courts boils down as to whether it is doing business or merely entered into an isolated transaction in the Philippines.

The fact that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines must be disclosed if it desires to sue in Philippine courts under the "isolated transaction rule." Without this disclosure, the court may choose to deny it the right to sue. 9

In the case at bar, the private respondents K.M.K. and INDRAPAL aver that they are "suing upon a singular and isolated transaction." But they failed to prove their legal existence or juridical personality as foreign corporations.

4. Merrill Lynch v. CA, 211 SCRA 824 (1992)

Merrill Lynch v. CA, 211 SCRA 824 (1992)

Facts: ML FUTURES, operating in the United States, had indeed done business with the Lara Spouses in the Philippines over several years, had done so at all times through Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc. (MLPI), a corporation organized in this country, and had executed all these transactions without ML FUTURES being licensed to so transact business here, and without MLPI being authorized to operate as a commodity futures trading advisor. The Laras did transact business with ML FUTURES through its agent corporation organized in the Philippines. The last transaction executed by ML FUTURES in the Laras's behalf had resulted in a loss amounting to US $160,749.69; that in relation to this loss, ML FUTURES had credited the Laras with the amount of US$75,913.42 — which it (ML FUTURES) then admittedly owed the spouses — and thereafter sought to collect the balance, US$84,836.27, but the Laras had refused to pay on the ground that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue.

Issue: WON ML FUTURES may sue in Philippine Courts to establish and enforce its rights against said spouses, in light of the undeniable fact that it had transacted business in this country without being licensed to do so.

WON the Lara Spouses are now estopped to impugn ML FUTURES' capacity to sue them in the courts of the forum.

Held: The defendant is estopped to deny the capacity of the foreign corporation to sue, having dealt with the corporation.

G.R. No. 97816 July 24, 1992

MERRILL LYNCH FUTURES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and the SPOUSES PEDRO M. LARA and ELISA G. LARA, respondents.

Facts: On 23 November 1987, Merrill Lynch futures, Inc. (ML FUTURES) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City against the Spouses Pedro M. Lara and Elisa G. Lara for the recovery of a debt and interest thereon, damages, and attorney's fees. In its complaint ML FUTURES described itself as (a) "a non-resident foreign corporation, not doing business in the Philippines, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Delaware, U.S.A.;" as well as (b) a 'futures commission merchant' duly licensed to act as such in the futures markets and exchanges in the United States, . . . essentially functioning as a broker (executing) orders to buy and sell futures contracts received from its customers on U.S. futures exchanges."

In its complaint ML FUTURES alleged:

(1) that on 28 September 1983 it entered into a Futures Customer Agreement with the spouses (Account 138-12161), in virtue of which it agreed to act as the latter's broker for the purchase and sale of futures contracts in the U.S.;

(2) that pursuant to the contract, orders to buy and sell futures contracts were transmitted to ML FUTURES by the Lara Spouses "through the facilities of Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation and a company servicing ML Futures' customers;"

(3) that from the outset, the Lara Spouses "knew and were duly advised that Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc. was not a broker in futures contracts," and that it "did not have a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission to operate as a commodity trading advisor (i.e., "and entity which, not being a broker, furnishes advice on commodity futures to persons who trade in futures contracts");

(4) that in line with the above mentioned agreement and through said Merill Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Lara Spouses actively traded in futures contracts, including "stock index futures" for four years or so, i.e., from 1983 to October, 1987, there being more or less regular accounting and corresponding remittances of money (or crediting or debiting) made between the spouses and ML FUTURES;

(5) that because of a loss amounting to US $160,749.69 incurred in respect of 3 transactions involving "index futures," and after setting this off against an amount of US $75,913.42 then owing by ML FUTURES to the Lara Spouses, said spouses became indebted to ML FUTURES for the ensuing balance of US $84,836.27, which the latter asked them to pay; and

(6) that the Lara Spouses however refused to pay this balance, "alleging that the transactions were null and void because Merrill Lynch Philippines, Inc., the Philippine company servicing accounts of ML Futures, had no license to operate as a "commodity and/or financial futures broker."

On the foregoing essential facts, ML FUTURES prayed (1) for a preliminary attachment against the spouses' properties "up to the value of at least P2,267,139.50," and (2) for judgment, after trial, sentencing the spouses to pay ML FUTURES: (a) the Philippine peso equivalent of $84,836.27 at the applicable exchange rate on date of payment, with legal interest from the date of demand until full payment; (b) exemplary damages in the sum of at least P500,000,00; and (c) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation as may be proven at the trial. Preliminary attachment issued ex parte on 2 December 1987, and the spouses were duly served with summons. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss dated 18 December 1987 on the grounds that (1) ML FUTURES had "no legal capacity to sue" and (2) its "complaint states no cause of action since it is not the real party in interest." On 12 January 1988, the Trial Court promulgated an Order sustaining the motion to dismiss, directing the dismissal of the case and discharging the writ of preliminary attachment. It later denied ML FUTURES's motion for reconsideration, by Order dated 29 February 1988. ML FUTURES appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its own decision promulgated on 27 November 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court's judgment. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, ML FUTURES appealed to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether – in light of the fact that the Laras were fully aware of its lack of license to do business in the Philippines, and in relation to those transactions had made payments to, and received money from it for several years –the Lara Spouses are estopped to impugn ML FUTURES capacity to sue them in the courts of the forum.

Held:

The Laras received benefits generated by their business relations with ML FUTURES. Those business relations, according to the Laras themselves, spanned a period of 7 years; and they evidently found those relations to be of such profitability as warranted their maintaining them for that not insignificant period of time; otherwise, it is reasonably certain that they would have terminated their dealings with ML FUTURES much, much earlier. In fact, even as regards their last transaction, in which the Laras allegedly suffered a loss in the sum of US$160,749.69, the Laras nonetheless still received some monetary advantage, for ML FUTURES credited them with the amount of US $75,913.42 then due to them, thus reducing their debt to US $84,836.27. Given these facts, and assuming that the Lara Spouses were aware from the outset that ML FUTURES had no license to do business in this country and MLPI, no authority to act as broker for it, it would appear quite inequitable for the Laras to evade payment of an otherwise legitimate indebtedness due and owing to ML FUTURES upon the plea that it should not have done business in this country in the first place, or that its agent in this country, MLPI, had no license either to operate as a "commodity and/or financial futures broker." Considerations of equity dictate that, at the very least, the issue of whether the Laras are in truth liable to ML FUTURES and if so in what amount, and whether they were so far aware of the absence of the requisite licenses on the part of ML FUTURES and its Philippine correspondent, MLPI, as to be estopped from alleging that fact as a defense to such liability, should be ventilated and adjudicated on the merits by the proper trial court.

5. USA v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

USA vs. Reyes

219 scra 192

Topic: Parties

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Private respondent Montoya is an american citizen who at the time material to this case, was employed an identification checkter at the US Navy exchange. Petitioner is likewise an americal citizen who was the acitivity exchange manager at JUSMAG headquarters. As a consequence whereby her body and belonging were search after she had bought some items from the retail store of the NEX JUSMAG while she was already at the parking area Montoya filed a complaint with the RTC of her residence – cavite – against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. She then prayed for judgment ordering bradford to pay her P500,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary damages and reasonable attorney's fees plus the costs of the suit. Bradford together with the government of US filed a motion to dismiss in support of the motion, petitoners claimed that JUSMAG composed of an army, Navy and Airgroup had been establisehd under the Philippine US agreement. Thus Bradford oders to have purchases of all employees checked was made in the exercise of her duties as Manager. Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment on the ground that Bradford was about to depart from the country and was in the process of removing and or disposing of her properties and filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss. The trial court resolved both motion to dismiss and the motion for preliminary attachment decreeing the issuance of a writ of attachment and directing the sheriff to serve the writ immediately. Bradford received a copy of the decision and she and the public petitioner filed with this court a petiton for restraining order which sought to have the trial court decision vacated and to prevent the execution of the same. In the meantime, since there was no MR was filed, the order directing an entry of final judgment was made.

Issues: WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss based on effect that the suit against the public petitoiner, a foreign sovereign immune from suit.

Held: Despite the fact that public petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant, it nevertheless joined bradford in the motion to dismiss without however first having obtained leave of court to intervene therein. This was a procedural lapse, if not downright improper legal tack. Since it was not impleaded as an original party, the public petitioner could on its own volition join in the case by intervening therein. The grant of intervention is discretionary upon the court and may be allowed only upon a prior motion for leave with notice to all the parties in the action. Of course, montoya could have also impleaded the public petitioner as an additional defendant by amending the complaint if she so believed that the latter is an indispensable or necessary party.

The filing of the instant petition and the knowledge thereof by the trial court did not prevent th elatter from proceeding with Civil case no. 224 – 87. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil actioin for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.

6. Flores v. Mallare-Philips, 144 SCRA 377 (1986)

Topic: Parties

Case: Flores vs. Mallare-Phillipps

Facts

Flores sued the resps for the collection of sum of money with the RTC

The first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981;

The second cause of action was against resp Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from pet on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.

Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said resp was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20K.

Although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to pet in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other resp. Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint.

RTC dismissed the complaint.

Issue

Whether or not the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the permissive joinder of parties.

Ruling

The lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

Section 33(l) of BP129

That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. ...

Section 11 of the Interim Rules

Application of the totality rule. In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of WON the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

Former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948

Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

The lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against resps Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

8.Mansion Biscuit v. CA, 250 SCRA 195 (1995)
MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, vs CA.

FACTS:

*Sometime in 1981 Ty Teck Suan, president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, ordered numerous cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation.

*Ty Teck with Siy Gui as co-signor issued four postdated checks to to Ang Cho Hong, president of Mansion in the amount of P100,000.00 each before the delivery of the goods they ordered.

*Accordingly, Mansion Biscuit Corporation delivered the goods. However, all the checks issued were dishonored.

*Hence, a case was filed against Ty Teck Suan for violation of BP 22 or the bouncing checks law.

*Ty Teck Suan pleaded not guilty and ordered to file a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer of evidence based on the following grounds, but in relation to the topic - (a) the subject checks were issued merely to guarantee or secure fulfillment of the agreement with the complainant which the court ruled in some cases to be neither estafa nor a violation of BP.

* In the same order of dismissal, Judge Capulong found that accused Siy Gui's liability had not been established by the prosecution as it appeared that he had no personal transactions with the complainant although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of four checks.¹⁸

* Meanwhile, petitioner Mansion Biscuit Corporation filed another appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 16580, this time assailing the trial court's ruling absolving defendants from civil liability in the criminal cases. Petitioner contended that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal cases did not necessarily extinguish their civil liability, citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals,²⁴ People v. Jalandoni,²⁵ Maximo v. Gerochi, Jr.²⁶ and People v. Relova.²⁷

ISSUE: WON Ty Teck and Siy Gui are proper parties in this case.

HELD:

We rule in the negative.

The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by petitioner to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondents because the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation. This is borne out by the records of the case. The information in Criminal Cases Nos. 5598-V-83 and 5599-V-83 filed against Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui reveal that the checks were issued "in payment of the cartons of nutri-wafer biscuits purchased from the Mansion Biscuit Corporation, represented by Ana Cho Hong, president thereof, by Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru said accused Ty Teck Suan."³³ Moreover, petitioner itself admitted that the contract was executed by and between Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, represented by its president, Ty Teck Suan, and Mansion Biscuit Corporation,³⁴ likewise represented by its president, Ang Cho Hong. This was correctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed decision and we quote:

The civil liability which the complainant seeks to enforce is the unpaid value of the nutri-van biscuits which were allegedly ordered by Ty Teck Suan from complainant and delivered by the latter between 12 November 1981 and the first week of January 1982. It is apparent from the record, however, that this civil liability is not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to private complainant Ang Cho Hong. It is the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation of which Ty Teck Suan was president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, of which Ang Cho Hong was president. This is clear from the Statement of Facts in plaintiffs-appellant brief, the relevant and pertinent portions of which read:

Sometime in 1981, Teck Suan, as president of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation ordered numerous cartons of nutri-van biscuits from Mansion Biscuit Corporation. As payment for these goods, Ty Teck Suan issued four (4) postdated checks amounting P404,980.00. These checks were delivered to Mr.Ang Cho Hong, President of Mansion biscuit corporation sometime during the first week of November, 1981 (p. 17, tsn of March 14, 1984). (at p. 10 of Brief, Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

These goods were received by Ty Teck Suan, through Edward Ty Brothers Corporation as its Consignees, and this was evidenced by the different receipts that have been issued by Edward Ty Brothers Corporation and its Consignees . . ., as well as by the "authority to deliver" documents issued by Edward Ty Brothers Corporation . . . and signed by one Elizabeth Ty Kho, the daughter of Ty Teck Suan (p. 24, tsn of June 13, 1984). (at pp. 11-12, ibid) Likewise, the informations uniformly state that the checks were "in payment of cartons of Nutri-Wafers biscuit purchased from the Mansion Biscuit Corporation, represented by Ang Cho Hong, President thereof, by the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru said accused Ty Teck Suan . . .

It is quite obvious from the foregoing that Ty Teck Suan did not purchase the biscuits for himself but for Edward Ty Brothers Corporation in his capacity as its president. Neither did Ang Cho Hong sell and deliver the biscuits in his personal capacity but for and in behalf of Mansion Biscuits Corporation of which he was president. The issue of the civil liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to Mansion Biscuits Corporation arising from the contract of purchase and sale between them could not have been and was not litigated and resolved in the criminal case inasmuch as they were not parties therein. A separate civil action must be instituted by Mansion Biscuits Corporation against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation to enforce the contract between them.³⁵

10. Imson v. CA, 239 SCRA 58 (1994)

FACTS:

The case at bench arose from a vehicular collision on December 11, 1983, involving petitioner's Toyota Corolla and a Hino diesel truck registered under the names of private respondents FNCB Finance Corporation and Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation.

On January 6, 1984, petitioner filed with the RTC Baguio City¹ a Complaint for Damages² Sued were private respondents as registered owners of the truck; truck driver Felix B. Calip, Jr.; the beneficial owners of the truck, Gorgonio Co Adarme, Felisa T. Co (also known as Felisa Tan), and Cirilia Chua Siok Bieng, and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corporation.

The Complaint prayed that defendants be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, two hundred seventy thousand pesos (P270,000.00) as compensatory damages, fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each as moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cost of suit.⁸

On May 29, 1987, however, petitioner and defendant insurer, entered into a compromise agreement.

In consequence of the compromise agreement, the trial court dismissed the Complaint for Damages against Western Guaranty Corporation on June 16, 1987.⁸ It argued that since they are all indispensable parties under a common cause of action, the dismissal of the case against defendant insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them.

The trial court denied the motion.

Private respondent Holiday Hills Stock and Breeding Farm Corporation assailed the denial order through a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Restraining Order filed with respondent Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 248-R ARE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES;

HELD:

There is merit to the petition,.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. ¹³ In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.¹⁴

Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court.¹⁵

He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation.¹⁶

It is true that all of petitioner's claims in Civil Case No. 248-R is premised on the wrong committed by defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants, however, cannot be categorized as indispensable parties. They are merely proper parties to the case. Proper parties have been described as parties whose presence is necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.¹⁷ It is easy to see that if any of them had not been impleaded as defendant, the case would still proceed without prejudicing the party not impleaded. Thus, if petitioner did not sue Western Guaranty Corporation, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit. The insurer, clearly, is not an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 248-R.

11. Casenas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 463 (1967)

Casenas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 463 (1967)

Facts:

Arañas and Caseñas filed a complaint for specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain deed of sale, and damages against the spouses Rosales. After answer has been filed and before trial, counsel for plaintiffs informed the trial court that plaintiff Arañas and defendant Rosales had both died. The lower court directed the surviving plaintiff, Caseñas, to amend the complaint to effect the necessary substitution of parties thereon. Caseñas failed to do this, so the TC dismissed the case. The dismissal became final. Thereafter, Caseñas filed another complaint against the widow Rosales and heirs of the late Rosales "to quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to real property, with damages." This suit referred itself to the very same property litigated in the previous dismissed case. and asserted exactly the same allegations as those made in the former complaint. Defendants filed MTD on ground of res judicata. TC dismissed the case.

Issue:

WON amendment of the complaint was proper in case of death of the party/parties

Held:

No.

When certain of the parties died and due notice thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to order, not the amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased. An order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of parties has been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void.

Escolin: where the defendant dies pending the case, the duty of the court is to order the substitution of the defendant, not to order the amendment of the complaint to implead the heirs of the defendant

de Leon: In Mina, the court ordered the amendment of the complaint to implead an indispensable party. The order was proper, hence failure to comply was a valid ground for dismissal of the complaint. In Casenas, the court ordered the amendment of the complaint to implead the heirs of a deceased party. The order was improper because the proper procedure was to substitute. Hence failure to comply was not a valid ground for dismissal of the complaint.

VENUE

1. Fortune Motors v. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)

Fortune Motors

178 scra 564

Topic: Venue

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA. Private respondent Metropolitan Bank extended various loan to petitioner fortune motors. For failure to pay the loans, the respondent initated foreclosure proceedings. Petitioner fortune motors filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure. Private respondent bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue of action was improperly laid in manila for the realty covered by the real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in the RTC of Makati. The lower court issued an order reserving the resolution of the bank's motion to dismiss until after the trial on the merits. Respondent bank field a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA and was granted. Hence, this petiton for review on certiorari.

Issues: WON petitioners action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of fortunre building is a personal action or a real action for venue purposes.

Held: In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as indicated in Sec. 2 of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Real action or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the CFI of the province where the property or any part thereof lies. Personal actions upon the other hand, maybe instituted in the CFI where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since an extra judicial foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in th eprovince where the property or part thereof lies.

2. Docoycoy v. CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991)

G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991

JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.

On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's demand.

On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of riceland located in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which in its decision of April 11, 1986,¹ affirmed the order of dismissal of his complaint.

In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of the trial court that the venue was improperly laid when the defendant, now private respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor waived the venue.

Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other words, petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the case motu proprio.

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is proper because the same can "readily be assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court of justice before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated as real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the location of the subject parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court . . .

Issue:

WON the order to dismiss by the trial court was improperly laid due to incorrect venue was proper.

Held:

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.⁴

Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be had.⁵

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.¹¹

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu propriothe complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.

3. Fortune Motors v. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)

Fortune Motors

178 scra 564

Topic: Venue

Issues: WON petitioners action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of fortunre building is a personal action or a real action for venue purposes.

4. Clavecilla Radio v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379 (1967)

Topic: Venue

Case: Clavecilla Radio System vs. Hon. Agustin Antillon

Facts

New Cagayan Grocery (NECAGRO) filed a complaint for damages against Clavecilla Radio system. They alleged that Clavecilla omitted the word “NOT” in the letter addressed to NECAGRO for transmittal at Clavecilla Cagayan de Oro Branch.

NECAGRO alleged that the omission of the word “not” between the word WASHED and AVAILABLE altered the contents of the same causing them to suffer from damages.

Clavecilla filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and improper venue.

City Judge of CDO denied the MTD. Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary Injunction with the CFI praying that the City Judge be enjoined from further proceeding with the case because of improper venue.

CFI – dismissed the case and held that Clavecilla may be sued either in Manila (principal office) or in CDO (branch office).

Clavecilla appealed to the SC contending that the suit against it should be filed in Manila where it holds its principal office.

Issue

Whether or not the present case against Clavecilla should be filed in Manila where it holds its principal office.

Ruling

YES.

It is clear that the case from damages is based upon a written contract. Under paragraph (b)(3) Section 1 Rule 4 of the New Rules of Court, when an action is not upon a written contract, then the case should be filed in the municipality where the defendant or any of the defendant resides or maybe served upon with summons. In corporation law, the residence of the corporation is the place where the principal office is established. Since Clavecilla’s principal office is in Manila, then the suit against it may properly be filed in the City of Manila. As stated in Evangelista vs. Santos, the laying of the venue of an action is not left to the plaintiff’s caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.

6. Lizares v. Calauag, 4 SCRA 746 (1962)

FACTS:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition of Dr. Antonio A. Lizares & Co., Inc., for a writ of prohibition because the venue of the case was improperly laid.
Flaviano Cacnio instituted a Civil Case at the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch against Lizares(petitioner).
Cacnio alleged that in 1955 he bought from petitioner on installment, Lot 4, Block 1 of the Sinkang Subdivision in Bacolod City, hence making a downpayment and the balance to be paid in 10 yearly installments with interest per year. Cacnio received from Lizares a demand for payment of P7,324.69 representing arrears in the payment of installments up 1960 plus regular and overdue interest as well as land taxes. (ultimately, mga utang2x ug interest nga wa mabayran.)
Cacnio issued payment but Lizares refused the tender of payment.
Hence Cacnio filed a case and ask for damages for “compensatory damages plus attorney’s fees.
On July 5, 1960, Lizares moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that "venue is improperly laid," for the action affects the title to or possession of real property located in Bacolod City, which was the subject matter of a contract, between petitioner and Cacnio, made in said City.
The motion having been denied by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, by an order of July 9, 1960, upon the ground that the action was in personam[RS1] , petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition, praying that said order be set aside and that a writ of prohibition be issued commanding respondent Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, as Judge of said Court, to desist from taking cognizance of said Civil Case. In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on October 27, 1960, dismissing said petition. Hence, this appeal by certiorari taken by petitioner herein.
ISSUE: The issue is whether or not the main case falls under section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, reading:

"Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies."

HELD:

According to SC: We are unable to share such view. Although the immediate remedy sought by Cacnio is to compel petitioner to accept the tender of payment allegedly made by the former, it is obvious that this relief is merely the first step to establish Cacnio's title to the real property adverted to above. Moreover, Cacnio's complaint is a means resorted to by him in order that he could retain the possession of said property. In short, venue in the main case was improperly laid and the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, should have granted the motion to dismiss. 1äwphï1.ñët

8.Diaz v. Adiong, 219 SCRA 631 (1993)

TOPIC: VENUE

G.R. No. 106847. March 5, 1993.

PATRICIO P. DIAZ vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; VENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC OFFICIAL. — From the provision of Article 360, third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published.

2. ID.; ID.; IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A NOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. — Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.

3. WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR BY FILING ANSWER. —

4. RELATES TO TRIAaL AND NOT TO JURISDICTION.

FACTS:

The Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City, published in its front page the news article captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed alleged anomalies by key officials in the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 3

The public officers alluded to instituted separate criminal and civil complaints arising from the libel before the City Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City.

The City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the criminal case.

Petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi City.

Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not be rightfully filed in Marawi City as none of the private respondents, who are all public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the alleged libelous news items published in that city. Consequently, it is petitioner's view that the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil action for damages.

ISSUES:

1. WON the RTC of Marawi City has jurisdiction over the case.

2. WON improper venue may be waived.

HELD: NO.

1. Firstly, Not one of the respondents then held office in Marawi City. Indeed, private respondents do not deny that their main place of work was not in Marawi City, although they had sub-offices therein.

Secondly, it is admitted that the libelous articles were published and printed in Cotabato City. Thus, respondents were limited in their choice of venue for their action for damages only to Cotabato City where Macumbal, Lanto and Abedin (defendants) had their office and Lanao del Norte where Indol worked. Marawi City is not among those where venue can be laid.

The third paragraph of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, specifically requires that —

"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, that where one of the offended parties is a public officer . . . (who) does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published . . . . " (emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published.

2. Consequently, it is indubitable that venue was improperly laid. However, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. 9

Ø Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim.

Ø His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule

Ø The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.

Ø Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is LIFTED.

9. Sweetlines v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 (1978)

SWEET LINES VERSUS TEVES

Facts: This is a Cagayan de Oro case which involves Sweet Lines, a shipping company with the head office in Cebu. The respondent Teves is the former City Fiscal of Davao City, former Mayor and became judge of CFI of Cagayan de Oro City.

There was a group of passenger who rode on the Sweet Lines bound for Cebu City. During the trip, they were given a crude treatment by the officers of the vessel. When they came back in Cagayan de Oro City, they filed a suit for damages against Sweet Lines. They file the case in the former CFI, now RTC, of Cagayan de Oro City because the plaintiffs are residents of Cagayan de Oro City.

Sweet Lines filed a motion to dismiss questioning the venue of the action because in the ticket issued by Sweet Lines, it is stipulated that “…in case of a civil action arising from the contract of carriage, the venue of the action shall be the City of Cebu ONLY and in no other place.” So there is a restrictive word. Obviously the lawyers of Sweet Lines knew about Polytrade because they moved to dismiss the case citing this case.

Judge Teves denied the motion to dismiss the case despite the stipulation. According to him, it is unfair. If I will dismiss the case based on this stipulation, the aggrieved parties will be discouraged in going to Cebu. It is very expensive and they will be inconvenienced. But, if the case will go on in Cagayan de Oro, it will not inconvenienced Sweet Lines because they have their branch office, their manager and their own lawyer.

Held: Although venue may be changed or transferred by agreement of the parties in writing, such an agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the Cebu City, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. On the other hand, Sweetlines has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in residence of plaintiff, as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvience to, much less prejudice Sweetlines. The stipulation, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest, since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger claimants outside of Cebu City, thus placing Sweetlines company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary to public policy

[RS1]person

Monday, November 27, 2017

CORPORATION LAW CASE ASSIGNMENTS (SECOND SEMESTER- BATCH 1)

CIVIL PROCEDURE (1ST BATCH)

1. Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983)

2. Candido v. Macapagal, 221 SCRA 328 (1993)

3. Ramos v. CA, 174 SCRA 690 (1989) (old digest)

4. Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983)

5. San Miguel v. Pundogar, 173 SCRA 704 (1989)

6. Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 (1994)

7. Gegare v. CA, 177 SCRA 471 (1989)

8. Galube v. Laureta, 157 SCRA 627 (1988)

2. Ortigas v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89 (1983)

3. Primero v. IAC, 156 SCRA 435 (1987)

4. Trade Union of the Philippines vs. Coscolluela, 140 SCRA 302 (1985)

6. Cabrera v. Tiano, 8 SCRA 542 (1963)

7. Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)

Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)

8. Hodges v. CA, GR 87617, 184 SCRA (1990)

9. Spouses de Leon v CA, 287 SCRA (1998)

10. Manuel v. Alfeche, 259 SCRA 475

1. Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369 (1971)

Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369 (1971)

2. Backrach Motor v. Icarañgal, 68 Phil 287 (1939)

3.Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521 (1989) (old digest)

Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521 (1989)

4.Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340 (1985) (old digest)

Agustin v. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340 (1985)

5. Maceda v. CA, 176 SCRA (1989)

6. Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91 (1987)

1. Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 115 SCRA 783 (1982) (old digest)

Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 115 SCRA 783 (1982)

2. Chang Kai Shek v. CA, 172 SCRA 389 (1989)

3. Commissioner of Customs v. KMK Gani, 182 SCRA 591 (1990)

4. Merrill Lynch v. CA, 211 SCRA 824 (1992)

Merrill Lynch v. CA, 211 SCRA 824 (1992)

5. USA v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

6. Flores v. Mallare-Philips, 144 SCRA 377 (1986)

8.Mansion Biscuit v. CA, 250 SCRA 195 (1995) MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, vs CA.

10. Imson v. CA, 239 SCRA 58 (1994)

11. Casenas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 463 (1967)

1. Fortune Motors v. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)

2. Docoycoy v. CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991)

3. Fortune Motors v. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)

4. Clavecilla Radio v. Antillon, 19 SCRA 379 (1967)

6. Lizares v. Calauag, 4 SCRA 746 (1962)

FACTS:

8.Diaz v. Adiong, 219 SCRA 631 (1993)

9. Sweetlines v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 (1978)

CORPORATION LAW CASE ASSIGNMENTS (SECOND SEMESTER- BATCH 1)

8.Mansion Biscuit v. CA, 250 SCRA 195 (1995)
MANSION BISCUIT CORPORATION, vs CA.